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From independent lawyer groups to civic opposition: 




Abstract: Independent Chinese lawyer and human rights defender groups pose challenges to the 
Chinese Party-State system. Drawing on the example of the ‘New Citizen Movement,’ this article 
argues that human rights lawyers have moved from proposing reform to demanding change of 
and putting up resistance. As the legal-political environment deteriorates under the current Xi 
Jinping leadership, their persistence is all the more significant. Their emergence and experience 
support an understanding of human rights as a social practice less dependent on legal authority 
than some mainstream accounts suggest.  
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
When, in January 2014, the legal scholar and veteran human rights defender Xu Zhiyong was 
sentenced to some four years in prison for a public order crime, supporters greeted the news with 
a mixture of dismay and relief. There was dismay, because Xu’s conviction testified to continued 
political persecution of innocent and patriotic human rights defenders in China. Yet there was 
also some relief because, considering Xu’s prominent role in the New Citizen Movement (xin 
gongmin yundong 新公民运动), the charge against him could have been more serious, and the 
sentence longer.1 Moreover, Xu himself, an articulate, sophisticated and determined forty-year-
old former academic, community organiser and activist, had long expected to be imprisoned; he 
was prepared to accept this as a consequence (however unjust) of his work.2 As detailed later, he 
was also able to continue his vocal advocacy from jail by releasing a video-recorded statement 
from pre-trial detention and publishing the statement he prepared for his trial; and the movement 
he had co-initiated inspired the creation of a dissident newsletter in support of the movement.  
The New Citizen Movement is one of the most prominent examples of civic legal-
political advocacy in in the shadows of China’s authoritarian system to date. It is the Chinese 
‘Arab Spring’ and ‘Occupy’ that never – quite - happened. Attracting no more than thousands of 
participants before the inevitable, swift and sweeping government clampdown, it was likely 
noticed by far more people than dared to participate. Its rise and repression is emblematic not 
only of the respective strengths of the Party-State and its people, but also of a shift in China’s 
civil society development, occurring at a time in contemporary history when rights advocacy still 
– just still - met with limited toleration from the government.  
Accordingly, this article aims to give an account of the Movement and similar initiatives, 
of their precursors and their prospects, and the context of legal-political human rights advocacy 
in which they arise. It will be seen that in historical perspective, the groups and initiatives 
                                                          
Reader in Transnational Law, King’s College London, Dickson Poon School of Law; non-resident senior research 
fellow, NYU US-Asia Law Institute.  
11 Didi Tang, ‘China hits activists with common-crime charges,’ Associated Press, 27 May 2014, 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/china-hits-activists-common-crime-charges. Hermann Aubié & Xinhong Wang (2016) , 
‘(Un)Doing Constitutionalism: The Cases of Liu Xiaobo and Xu Zhiyong,’ Asian Studies Review, 40:3, 377-393. 
2 Yaxue Cao, ‘Who is Xu Zhiyong? Interview with Dr. Teng Biao,’ parts 1 (10 April 2014) and 2 (13 April 2014), 
ChinaChange, https://chinachange.org/2014/04/10/who-is-xu-zhiyong/.  
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discussed here are able to organize more easily and to engage in more vocal political rights 
advocacy than some ten years ago, when professional rights defence emerged as a socio-political 
phenomenon in China. The spontaneity and fluidity of their organizing strategies and methods of 
communication has not only helped them overcome certain obstacles commonly found in highly 
repressive systems. Their organizational openness has also allowed them to strengthen their 
identities as citizens, understood in an overtly political, liberal and democratic sense.  
Reflecting global changes in legal-political advocacy, these initiatives are significant for 
Chinese and transnational civil society, whether or not they succeed in the shorter term. As the 
persecution of the New Citizen and wider human rights lawyer movement, and the public 
branding of rights lawyers as public enemy figures toward the end of the research period 
illustrated,3 their experience helps explain how law can drive the defence of human rights and 
how legal advocacy can evolve into political resistance. These insights are all the more important 
at a time when a ‘new authoritarianism’ and ‘democratic recession’ appear to take hold in more 
and more political communities around the world.4  
Discussion in the following first addresses the Movement’s background in independent 
legal-political advocacy (part II), as well as advocacy NGOs and independent organization 
amongst human rights lawyers (part III). Understanding the New Citizen Movement’s rise and 
repression between 2012 and 2014, other novel forms of civic organizing in China, and the 
political implications of these initiatives (part IV) is also essential to understanding the 
subsequent stepping up of pressure, exemplified by even harsher attempts to destroy and vilify 
civic lawyer advocacy from 2015 onward (part V). The discussion here draws, inter alia, on 
loosely structured conversations, in person and via the social media, with lawyers who self-
define as ‘rights defence lawyers,’ ‘human rights lawyers,’ or la human rights defenders working 
with lawyers, and on observation of their gatherings and discussions between October 2010 and 
July 2017.5  It adopts an interpretive and value-based approach, rooted in an understanding of 
                                                          
3 The lawyers who were interlocutors for this project include many of those targeted in the so-called ‘7-09’ 
crackdown on lawyers (discussed below).  
4 Alexander Cooley, ‘Authoritarianism Goes Global: Countering Democratic Norms’ (2015) 26 Journal of 
Democracy, 49-63, available at http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/authoritarianism-goes-global-countering-
democratic-norms; Larry Diamond, ‘Facing up to the Democratic Recession’ (2015) 26 Journal of Democracy, 141-
155, available at http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/facing-democratic-recession; critically: Steven Levitsky 
and Lucan Way, ‘The Myth of Democratic Recession’ (2015) 26 Journal of Democracy, 45-58, available at 
<http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Levitsky-26-1.pdf. See also  Varol, Ozan O., ‘Stealth 
Authoritarianism,’ (April 24, 2014). Iowa Law Review, Vol. 100, 2015, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2428965.  
5 The author conducted audio-recorded conversations in person with about eighty rights lawyers and twenty non-
lawyer rights defenders between October 2010 and April 2016, and communicated with some of the interlocutors 
beyond this point via social media. The interlocutors were chosen mainly from a small group of some one to three 
hundred legal professionals and human rights advocates. Some ninety percent of these conversations were conducted 
in mainland China; and of these, some ninety percent were conducted in urban and semi-public settings such as 
coffee-shops and public parks. Some other conversations were held in Hong Kong and other places outside China; 
and some in non-urban settings such as in the context of a lawyer workshop retreat. All quoted passages have been 
anonymised using standard social science techniques and bearing in mind the fact that the interlocutors are at high 
risk of government abuses. I conducted recorded conversations with about eighty rights lawyers and about forty non-
lawyer rights defenders between October 2010 and July 2017. Of these interlocutors, as of August 2017, some nine 
lawyers and four non-lawyers have been criminally convicted for their advocacy. Some twenty-two have suffered 
detention without trial, including forced disappearances; and well over half have reported suffering physical 
violence, including torture. 
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II Political rights advocacy as a choice produced by institutional dysfunction      
 
Forceful legal advocacy is a relatively recent phenomenon in the history of the PRC. Weiquan 维
权 lawyers or, as they now more often call themselves, human rights (renquan 人权) lawyers 
emerged in the late 1990s, made possible by the legal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s.7  Their 
emergence might be regarded as a further and possibly unintended consequence of the Party-
State’s attempts to seek legitimacy through lawful administration and protection of people’s legal 
rights and interests, and until about 2004, rights defence (weiquan) was officially largely 
tolerated and achieved some, however limited, successes such as the revocation of a State 
Council Regulation in the wake of the now-famous Sun Zhigang Incident,8 a case closely related 
to the person of Xu Zhiyong and to the emergence of the New Citizen Movement discussed in 
this article:  
 Sun Zhigang had died in custody, a young internal migrant beaten to death by inmates 
and prison guards, in 2003. He had been held under a special administrative detention system 
created for those internal (often: rural-urban) migrants who were found without the required 
documents showing they had a right to be in the city. Abuses of the system were rife; they 
included ransom-taking from, as well as violence in custody against these sans-papiers. 
Following the death of Sun Zhigang, liberal scholars including three young PhD graduates, Teng 
Biao, Yu Jiang and Xu Zhiyong, argued that it followed from Article 37 in conjunction with 
sections 8 and 9 of the Legislation Law that the administrative regulation that allowed Sun’s 
detention was unlawful (unconstitutional) since these provisions require that the deprivation of 
liberty be based on NPC law and premised on a judicial or procuratorial decision. 9  Their 
argument was based in the broader principle that restrictions of the general right to liberty of the 
person must themselves be lawful, and that mere say-so by power-holders is not enough.  
In their action following the Sun Zhigang Incident, they were persuasive and, within 
limits, successful in so arguing: the detention system in question was officially abolished thanks 
to their advocacy efforts, which had been supported by other scholars, by the popular press, and 
                                                          
6 In legal theory, interpretivism was developed by Dworkin (1986). Ronald Dworkin, Ronald, Law's Empire, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1986. For an interpretive account of the social practice of human 
rights, see Isabel Trujillo and Francesco Viola What Human Rights Are Not (Nova Science Publishers 2014), xii. 
7 Cullen, Richard and Fu Hualing, ‘Weiquan (Rights Protection) Lawyering in an Authoritarian State: Building a 
Culture of Public-Interest Lawyering,’ The China Journal, No. 59 (Jan., 2008), pp. 111-127 at p.116; Teng Biao,  
‘What is Rights Defence’, in Stacy Mosher and Patrick Poon (editors) A Sword and a Shield: China's Human Rights 
Lawyers (China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group: Hong Kong, 2009).  
8 Hand, Keith, ‘Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang Incident and Evolving Forms of Citizen 
Action in the People's Republic of China,’ 45 The Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2006) 138, at 
http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/repository/Hand/45ColumJTransnatlL114.pdf.  
9 For a discussion of the arguments challenging the constitutionality of the now-abolished Custody and Repatriation 
system, see Keith Hand, ‘Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang Incident and Evolving Forms of 
Citizen Action in the People's Republic of China’ (2006) 45 The Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 138, 
available at <http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/repository/Hand/45ColumJTransnatlL114.pdf> [last accessed 10 
November 2016]. The law cited is 中华人民共和国立法法  [PRC Law on Legislation], promulgated by the 
Standing Committee of National People's Congress, 15 March 2000, effective 1 July 2000, available at 
<http://www.gov.cn/test/2005-08/13/content_22423.htm> [last accessed 10 November 2016] [‘Hand’]. 
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expressions of support from the public. While according to an account by one of the initiators, 
the human rights scholar Teng Biao, some abuses the system gave rise to persisted,10 the incident 
was nevertheless an instance of ‘bringing the Constitution alive (jihuo xianfa 激活宪法)’ in the 
inclement conditions of the existing legal system.11 At the time, this success achieved by the 
‘three doctors of law’ was celebrated by fellow academics and in the public media; and Xu and 
his colleagues seemed set to play a prominent, yet relatively safe and predictable, role in China’s 
development toward a more liberal system. 
As the Sun Zhigang Incident illustrated, the starting point of a human rights lawyer’s 
advocacy is often their work on an individual case of injustice, and justice, or redress, is sought 
through institutionalised mechanisms. In most such cases, lawyers start by using court litigation; 
but their ability to promote the protection of constitutional rights or human rights under public 
international law is limited.  
To be sure, the 1982 Constitution (last revised in 2004) articulates liberal principles in 
Chapter 2, and authoritarian (Leninist and Maoist) principles in Chapters 1 and 3.12 Chapter 2 of 
the Constitution safeguards the right to equality before the law, the right to vote, freedom of 
speech, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of religion, freedom and security of the 
person, freedom from insult, freedom from violation of the home, and the privacy of 
correspondence, as well as certain socio-economic rights. 13 The Constitution also gestures at a 
principle of genuine rule of law. Its Article 5 states that  
 
‘All state organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all 
enterprises and institutions must abide by the Constitution and the law. All acts in 
violation of the Constitution and the law must be investigated. No individuals or 
organizations are above the Constitution or the law.’  
 
An amendment in 2004 added the phrase ‘the State respects and preserves human rights’ to 
Article 33.14 Further, China is a State party to numerous human rights treaties. It has signed 
albeit not yet ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),15 and it 
has signed and ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR),16 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
                                                          
10 Ibid. 
11 Teng Biao, ‘The Sun Zhigang Incident and the Future of Constitutionalism: Does the Chinese Constitution Have a 
Future?’ (30 December 2013) CRJ Occasional Paper 
<https://www.law.cuhk.edu.hk/en/research/crj/download/papers/2013-tb-szg-constitutionalism.pdf> [last accessed 
27 October 2016].  
12 E.g. Teng Biao, ‘Rights Defence, Microblogs, and the Surrounding Gaze: The Rights Defence Movement Online 
and Offline,’ in Locating Civil Society: Communities Defending Basic Liberties, Special Issue of China Perspectives 
2012 / no.3.  
13 Albert Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the PRC (4th edition) An Introduction to the Legal System of 
the People's Republic of China (4th edition, 2011), chapter 4.  
14 The Constitution also lists duties of citizens and  also stipulates in its Article 51 that the exercise of constitutional 
rights may not ‘infringe upon the interests of the state, of society or of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms 
and rights of other citizens.’ 
15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
16 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 
January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICSECR).  
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(CEDAW), 17  the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD),18 the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT),19 the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 20  and the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). 21 (It has not acceded to the Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families22  and the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.23) 
However, there are few institutional mechanisms for safeguarding the standards and 
principles these norms articulate, and their effectiveness is limited. At the international level, 
China has opted out of the individual complaints procedures of the UN institutions. At the 
domestic level, as Ahl has pointed out, courts apply treaty provisions only ‘on the basis of 
statutory reference provisions or judicial interpretations commanding application of an 
international standard,’ 24 not available in human rights norms. The judiciary has so far also been 
unable to overcome bureaucratic obstacles to giving domestic constitutional human rights norms 
effect;25 and even its ability to review norms in violation of ordinary NPC laws is limited. The 
mechanism used in the wake of the Sun Zhigang Incident, on the other hand, is lacking in 
transparency and does not adopt a forensic format, making it difficult to achieve or track 
success. 26  As the Sun Zhigang Incident also showed, moreover, the system is riddled with 
systematic abuses especially in the context of administrative and criminal detention and the 
wider criminal justice system. Many of these abuses violate not only constitutional rights but 
also written laws that courts do have a mandate to apply and uphold; but for various institutional 
reasons centred in what Li has termed ‘judicial dependence,’27 the courts are unable to address 
systematic abuses, such as police torture, effectively.  
In such conditions of systemic disregard for the law, even a lawyer’s insistence on taking 
the written, black-letter rules of the law -- let alone the more abstract rights and principles found 
in constitutional rights provisions -- seriously can become an act of subversion of the system as it 
                                                          
17 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December 
1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW).  
18 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 December 1965, entered into 
force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195 (CERD). 
19 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) 1465 UNTS 
85. 
20 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990), 1577 
UNTS 3 (CRC).  
21 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 30 March 2007, entered into force 3 May 2008, 
CRPD).  
22 Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (adopted 18 
December 1990, entered into force 1 July 2003) 2220 UNTS 3 (CPRM).  
23 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (adopted 20 December 
2006, entered into force 23 December 2010) 2716 UNTS 3.  
24 Bjoern Ahl, ‘Chinese Law and International Treaties’ (2009) 39 Hong Kong Law Journal 751, available at 
http://www.cesl.edu.cn/eng/upload/201106214048086.pdf ; Congyan Cai, ‘International law in Chinese courts’, 
American Journal of International Law, 110:2 (2016) 269, at 282 f. For an overview of treaties signed and ratified 
see Bayefsky, ‘The United Nations Human Rights Treaties – China,’ as of 20 September 2011 at 
http://www.bayefsky.com/bycategory.php/state/36.   
25 This is discussed in the following section.  
26 Hand, supra. For example, ordinary, private users of this system are not even entitled to a reply to their suggestion 
letters sent to the relevant NPC Standing Committee working group.  




actually, ordinarily works. Examples are furnished, not only by high-profile cases such as that of 
Sun Zhigang. Many more everyday examples include the simple act of challenging a defendant’s 
forced confession by demanding its exclusion as evidence supporting a conviction, 28  and 
attempts to get an application for civil or administrative court litigation accepted by a judge 
reluctant to handle the case for fear of being disciplined or retaliated against. Whereas at one 
level the system as represented in some of its written rules envisages and invites challenges to 
public power, it is at another level highly intransigent to it.29 Even when it can take place, 
lawyers’ courtroom advocacy is fraught with difficulties that include blocking sympathisers from 
attending court hearings, suppression of arguments and evidence during court hearings, and 
lawyer intimidation.30  
While the principle of ‘judicial dependence,’ as Li Ling has argued, 31  is pervasive, 
resulting dysfunctionalities of the judicial process are especially evident in cases deemed 
‘politically sensitive.’ Take this description, by Lawyer Li Heping, of the trial of Falun Gong 
practitioner Wang Bo in a ‘using an evil cult to undermine the implementation of the law’ case 
(in which he collaborated with a number of rights lawyers also including Teng Biao), by way of 
example.  
 
‘This “open trial” was really ridiculous…The three defendants were brought in wearing 
handcuffs and prison uniforms. In accordance with law, we requested that the court 
remove the defendants' shackles and uniforms, and the court consented. When we tried to 
talk about religion and the Constitution, however, the judges repeatedly interrupted us, 
saying we could only speak of the facts and not of the law. I was very angry and loudly 
challenged them: If the court doesn't allow lawyers to talk of the Constitution or of the 
law, how can it be a court? The judges were tongue-tied, but they continued to interrupt 
us all the same. 
It should be said that all five lawyers on the defense bench performed very well 
and were very attentive in their exploration of facts and law. The prosecution could only 
ward off our blows without any power to strike back. During the trial, when we read out 
our defense plea, the prosecution was humiliated and enraged, saying our political 
inclinations were problematic and we would be investigated.’32 (Emphases added)  
 
As a result, it is nearly impossible to win certain types of cases by use of individuated rights 
advocacy through the judicial process or any other institutionalised process controlled by the 
Party-State. Even in cases of clear miscarriage of justice, lawyers can find themselves unable to 
                                                          
28 Human Rights Watch, ‘Tiger chairs and cell bosses: police torture of criminal suspects in China’ (13 May 2015), 
available at <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/05/13/tiger-chairs-and-cell-bosses/police-torture-criminal-suspects-
china>; Committee Against Torture, ‘Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of China (advance 
version)’ (9 December 2015), available at <http://www.savetibet.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/CAT_C_CHN_CO_5_22477_E.pdf> .  
29 ‘Even’ the far more open process in liberal systems can exhibit such intransigence to an astonishing degree, as 
discussed comparatively by Mike McConville in Mike McConville and Eva Pils (editors), Criminal Justice in China: 
Comparative Perspectives, Elgar Publishing (2013) (Chapter 1).  
30  Chapter 4 of Eva Pils, China’s human rights lawyers, supra.   
31 Li ling, supra.  




obtain adequate redress for their clients.  A lawyer who had worked since the early 2000s in 
rights defence summed up his experience as follows:   
 
‘As long as there is no judicial independence, whatever you do in the courtroom in those 
cases of repression really just amounts to helping them enact a piece of theatre. They 
don’t care.’ 33 
 
In conversation and in their own writing in the social media, rights lawyers have characterised 
the attitude of the Party-State in these contexts as ‘anti-rule-of-law (fan fazhi 反法治);34 and so 
far as their advocacy is intended to strengthen rule of law, they regard it as rightly challenging 
and destabilising authoritarian control of the legal system.  
In this situation, it is a logical step for lawyers to begin addressing their arguments no 
longer to the Court (or to the authorities) alone, and ‘to take the action from inside the courtroom 
to outside, and let the Great Public Jury [the Court of Public Opinion] decide.’ 35  Speaking of the 
trial of Wang Bo, for example, Lawyer Li Heping also commented: 
 
 ‘Even though the Party committee had the final say in the judgment of the case, a serious 
defense could still make an impression in court and at least win the hearts of those in the 
public gallery. I believe we achieved that goal in the Wang Bo case. This is not hard to 
understand. After all, the few judges and prosecutors who take any notice of religious 
issues or citizen's constitutional rights invariably side with the Party committee and resort 
to clichés when confronted by rule of law. These specious standpoints can't stand up 
under systematic, closely-reasoned questioning, and judges who don’t candidly admit 
defeat can only balk, as in our trial. A judge who simply balks instead of speaking of 
fairness, justice and law falls into disrepute and loses credibility.’36 
 
As a result of the institutional dysfunctionality exhibited by trials such as Wang Bo’s, and more 
widely by the problems of unfair trials and denial of access to justice mentioned earlier on, 
lawyers have moved outside the courtroom to engage in what one might call both political and 
legal rights advocacy about specific cases outside the institutions and channels provided by the 
Party-State. Lawyers have, for example, complained publicly about not being allowed to see 
their criminally detained client by unfurling protest banners and holding up signs outside official 
buildings, subsequently disseminating images of these actions online.37  They have used the 
social media to report on the progress of court cases, and used secretly produced pictures and 
video footage to disseminate evidence of torture in cases were the authorities refused to address 
                                                          
33 #23 2013-1.  
34 Chinese Lawyers for the Protection of Human Rights (中国保障人权律师团/Zhongguo baozhang renquan 
lüshituan), ‘中国保障人权律师团律师对劳教制度废止相关问题的声明 / Zhongguo baozhang renquan lüshituan 
lüshi dui laojiao zhidu feizhi xiangguan wenti de shengming [Statement on Abolition of RTL and Related Problems 
by Chinese Lawyers for the Protection of Human Rights],’19 November 2013 at 
http://www.siweiluozi.net/2013/11/statement-on-abolition-of-re-education.html  
35 #23-13-1. 
36 Li Heping, ‘The Wang Bo Case and Freedom of Religion ,’ 2010, draft on file with author, translated by Stacy 
Mosher.  
37 Lawyer Shi Qing (石青律师) [pen name], ‘营口中院非法剥夺律师阅卷权 [The Intermediate Court of Yingkou 




the allegation of torture.38 They have also signed public statements in support of colleagues 
working on such cases and of colleagues who have themselves been victimised (an issue 
discussed in greater detail below), and they have used blogs, microblogs and the media (in 
particular, overseas media) to disseminate such messages.  
The publication of, for example, litigation-related documents, submissions to the court, 
and the like, via the social media may be reprehensible in a better-functioning legal system; but 
in the circumstances of a system marred by obscurity and repression, some rights lawyers 
contend that these methods are legitimate, due to the suppression of legitimate arguments and 
evidence when trying to use official channels. Lawyers disagree on how much publicity is 
appropriate -- an older generation, represented by the well-known Lawyer Mo Shaoping, are 
generally more averse to publicity. As Teng Biao’s reflection on this discussion illustrates, it is 
inseparable from a long-standing, wider debate about the nature of law and lawfulness within the 
constraints of an authoritarian system. Broadly speaking positivistic views, according to which 
the law is strictly separate from morals, are used to argue that in their professional arguments, 
lawyers must not concern themselves with matters thought to be beyond the letter of the law. 
This approach would not capture the moral responsibility we have to stand up against immoral 
law, at least in the liberal positivist tradition;39 but understandably, such views have always been 
attractive as a view in systems where advocacy is risky, even dangerous.  
 
‘According to one view, as a lawyer, you must only discuss the law, discuss what the 
evidence and the applicable law in a particular case are, what procedural problems exist – 
you can only discuss the law, not politics; you can’t talk about the persecution of religion 
or introduce your own political demands. Concurrently you also mustn’t take media 
interviews, especially from the overseas media, or hype up an issue, and so on. There is a 
faction that holds, to use Mo Shaoping’s phrase, that “political issues must be legalised, 
legal issues must be professionalised and professional issues must be technicized” and 
that through these “three -izations” human rights cases can be sublimated without trace.’  
Other human rights lawyers hold that in the Chinese context, any legal problem is 
hard to separate from the influence of politics; for example, taking on [Protestant] house-
church cases, undertaking criminal defence in Falun Gong cases – if you only discussed 
if that particular Falun Gong practitioner printed 200 or 300 [proselytising] leaflets, if 
they should be sentenced to two years or to five: if that’s all you discuss, it is totally 
meaningless, because you don’t change the outcome [anyway]. So the constitutional and 
freedom of religion issues in the background [of such a case] absolutely have to be 
discussed.’40 
 
From Teng Biao’s and like-minded rights lawyers’ perspective, then, the approach that rejects 
isolating narrow legal questions from deeper constitutional and moral ones,  demands more 
                                                          
38 He Yang, Conversation with Lawyer Zhu Mingyong on torture (专访朱明勇律师—黑打 / Zhuanfang Zhu 
Mingyong lüshi – hei da ) by He Yang (何杨), independent documentary film, August 2010, on file with author.  
39 H.L.A. Hart famously insisted that the certification of legal validity was ‘not conclusive of the question of 
obedience.’ H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd edition, 1994.  
40 Teng Biao (滕彪), 中国维权运动的历史和现状 [The History and Current Situation of the Chinese Rights 
Defence Movement],’ Centre on Religion and Chinese Society, Purdue University, 13 October 2014,  
 https://www.purdue.edu/crcs/events/purdue-symposium-ch/purdue-symposium-2014-ch/tengbiao/. Also Pils, 2007. 
Pils, Eva, ‘‘Asking the Tiger For His Skin: Rights Activism in China,’ Vol XXX (2007) Fordham International Law 
Journal, pp. 1209 -1287. 
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expansive advocacy strategies, so as to overcome obstacles to advocacy that result from 
institutional dysfunction. Rights lawyers have responsibilities beyond the courtroom in situations 
where the courtroom is not a forum in which the law will be upheld or in which justice could 
possibly be achieved. 
Accordingly, they should strive to achieve transparency about what they do and what the 
authorities do, not just because exposure of abuses is on the whole likely to promote a more 
favourable outcome of their case.41 They also address their arguments to a wider public that may 
allow for the authorities to be criticised. 42  In conversation, rights lawyers stated that they 
generally eschewed encouraging their clients to trade justice for ‘leniency,’43 and that they were 
neither inclined to, nor can they afford to, engage in any behaviour that would expose them to 
accusations of violating the law or professional discipline (such as, say, bribing a judge).44 Even 
when going public does not change the outcome of the legal process they engage in, it may help 
to reduce or prevent further abuses – thus, human rights lawyers point out that, for example, 
exposure of a confession extracted by torture may result in less harsh treatment of their client.  
Rights lawyers reflecting on this process showed themselves aware that using public 
dissemination of case-related information served a dual function in the context of legal advocacy 
and resistance.  
 
‘In these typical cases, lawyers resisting together achieve that firstly, they raise legal 
consciousness and promote the idea of rule of law [in the general population]…Through 
lawyers’ resistance, the so called system-internal forces of public power are also 
prompted to gain a better understanding of problems that exist in their own work. This, 
up to a point, may help to prevent --it may help to encourage them to respect the law 
more in future.’ 45 
 
Notwithstanding their disagreements and debates, the pressures lawyers encounter are systemic; 
in principle, they affect all lawyers working on similar cases. Communication about cases thus 
creates a natural basis for alliances between lawyers of slightly different orientation, so far as 
they are willing to question and disrupt the dysfunctionalities of the judicial process described 
earlier. This includes lawyers who see themselves as ‘diehard’ (sike 死嗑), tough and principled, 
lawyers and those who prefer the description ‘rights defence’ or ‘human rights’ lawyers (weiquan 
维权 or renquan lüshi 人权 律师).  A lawyer remarked that  
 
                                                          
41 This does not mean, of course, that lawyers go out of their way to let the authorities know about activities likely to 
trigger persecution; or that they feel under obligation to disclose their activities. #122-16-1. 
42 #74 -13-1. See Zhang Xueran, ‘China’s All-Star Legal Team Pleads for Defendants’ Rights On Social Media,’ Tea 
Leaf Nation 25 July 2012 at http://tealeafnation.com/2012/07/bilingual-brew-chinas-all-star-legal-team-pleads-for-
defendants-rights-on-social-media.   
43 Jiang Jue, Criminal Reconciliation in Contemporary China: An Empirical and Analytical Enquiry (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2016). 
44 #23-10-3.  
45 #74 2013-1. See also Ch. 4 and Zhang Xueran, ‘China’s All-Star Legal Team Pleads for Defendants’ Rights On 




‘Chinese human rights lawyers are amongst the most vibrant dissident forces in Chinese 
civil society these days. While the pressure I spoke of brings about more self-censorship 
amongst some, amongst others, it enhances a sense of opposition and shared values.’46 
 
Comments such as these reflect the fact that the dysfunctionality of legal institutions also 
encourages a move from ‘human rights as law’ to ‘human rights as politics,’ in Michael 
Ignatieff’s phrase.47 Since the Party-State system does not accommodate oppositional politics 
and strictly controls independent civil society activities, the move to ‘human rights as politics’ 
enhances the system-oppositional nature of rights advocacy, and thus traits which (as the threat 
issued by prosecutors to the defence lawyers, quoted above, already illustrated) may be regarded 
as subversive by the authorities.  
 In sum, although they are severely limited within their institutionally defined roles, 
lawyers can make a conscious choice to oppose such limitations, even in the highly restrictive 
setting of the authoritarian Chinese legal system. They can appeal to liberal values, rules and 
principles recognised in the laws of the Chinese Party-State, even though these values, rules and 
principles are in conflict with authoritarian principles that are also recognised by the system. 
When they articulate their insistence on adherence to those rules and principles, they engage in a 
form of legal advocacy that is concurrently an exercise of their human rights of expression, and a 
form of political resistance, because the authorities view it thus. Their use and experience of 
public legal advocacy, moreover, can awaken lawyers to the potential of (mass) communication 
as a tool of resistance. In contrast to liberal-democratic settings, there is no alternative of more 
tolerated oppositional politics, moreover.48 
The logical next step, a step that has in fact already been taken by the time they have 
established informal communicative networks, is to create independent associations.  
 
 
III Advocacy NGOs and case- and cause-based professional organisations 
 
Chinese lawyers face many obstacles to independent professional organisation. The authorities in 
China have established an official professional organisation for lawyers that is strictly 
hierarchical. Membership of the All China Lawyers’ Association (ACLA) is compulsory for all 
licenced lawyers, and that seeks to control the professional activities of lawyers down to the 
question of what kinds of case they may take on and what strategies they ought to pursue in 
handling these cases. Official lawyers’ associations could therefore be described as agents of 
state corporatism.  
The ACLA and its subordinate local entities can exert great pressure on law firms and 
individual lawyers working in these firms through a professional licencing system, in whose 
operation it plays a central role, and the justice authorities can impose (further) disciplinary and 
punitive measures, although ACLA and its subordinate organisations claim to represent the legal 
                                                          
46 #74 2014-1.  
47  Michael Ignatieff, ‘Human Rights As Politics / Human Rights as Idolatry,’ The Tanner Lectures, Princeton, 4-7 
April 200, available at <http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/i/Ignatieff_01.pdf>, at p. 6. 
48 Michael Walzer, ‘The Politics of Resistance,’ Dissent Magazine, 1 March 2017,  
<https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/the-politics-of-resistance-michael-walzer>, juxtaposes resistance 
with oppositional politics.  
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profession’s interests.49 ACLA also became the conduit through which the Party unfolded a ‘total 
coverage’ (quan fugai 全覆盖) campaign intended to ensure that all law firms would have a 
Party branch established or associated with them.50   
In line with this corporatist approach, the political-legal system in China does not tolerate 
free professional associations for lawyers and severely restricts nongovernmental civil society 
organisations.51 Lawyers, as a consequence, face regulatory limitations if they wish to found or 
join independent professional organisations or advocacy NGOs. Thus several important lawyer-
driven rights advocacy NGOs, including the Open Constitution Initiative discussed just below, 
the Transition Institute, and China Against Death Penalty, were either registered as commercial 
non-profit enterprises, or not registered at all. Throughout the research period, NGOs considered 
hostile are at risk of being charged with tax violations or dissolved, as well as of monitoring and 
other forms of persecution. Criminal law can also be used to control lawyers, for example, by 
charges of offences against ‘state security’ or of public order offences;52  and in 2015, restrictions 
discussed later (in Part V) were introduced. The Criminal Law has a special provision 
criminalising ‘illegal assembly,’53 which can be used to disrupt meetings, as discussed later on 
(in Part IV) with reference to the New Citizen and Southern Street movements.  
In addition to rules and measures limiting lawyers’ ability to organise independently,  the 
Party-State’s security apparatus also uses measures such as electronic surveillance, requests for 
‘chats,’  ‘being travelled,’ house arrest, forced disappearances and torture to control lawyers.54 
Lawyer repression became increasingly severe from around 2004,55 when Lawyer Gao Zhisheng 
高智晟 engaged in online advocacy to publish the narratives of Falun Gong practitioners who 
detailed their experience of torture at the hands of the State. Authorities including the justice 
bureaux, official lawyers’ associations, the judiciary, and the police domestic security protection 
squads or guobao (国保) as well as the national security or guo’an (国安) authorities contribute 
to repression, which ranges from instructions to lawyers not to take on particular cases or to 
handle them in a particular way, to disbarment, prison sentences, forced disappearances and 
torture. The authorities have on occasion explicitly stated toward lawyer victims of such 
                                                          
49 For ACLA’s stated goals see ACLA website; Article 45 of the Law on Lawyers on the role of Lawyers’ 
Associations.  
50 Wu Fengshi and Chan Kin-man, ‘Graduated Control and Beyond: the Evolving Government-NGO Relations,’ 
China Perspectives 2012 no. 3 at p. 9; Spires, Anthony, ‘Contingent Symbiosis and Civil Society in an Authoritarian 
State: Understanding the Survival of China’s Grassroots NGOs,’ American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 117, No. 1 
(July 2011), pp. 1-45.   
51 The passage of new legislation on domestic charities and on foreign NGOs testifies to this tendency. Wong, 
Edward, ‘Clampdown in China Restricts 7,000 Foreign Organizations,’ New York Times, 26 April 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/world/asia/china-foreign-ngo-law.html?_r=0.  
52  Tang, Didi, ‘China hits activists with common-crime charges,’ Associated Press, 27 May 2014 , 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/china-hits-activists-common-crime-charges. 
53中华人民共和国刑法 [PRC Criminal Law], passed on 1 July 1979, promulgated on 6 July 1979, and effective as 
of 1 January 1980, last revised on 29 August 2015, at 
http://chinalawtranslate.com/%E4%B8%AD%E5%8D%8E%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E5%85%B1%E5%92%
8C%E5%9B%BD%E5%88%91%E6%B3%95%EF%BC%882015%E5%B9%B4%E4%BF%AE%E6%AD%A3%E
F%BC%89/?lang=en, Article 296.  
54 Pils, Disappearing (supra).   
55 Preliminary Opinions on the reform of the Judicial System and Working Mechanisms  2004, 626 f. Discussed in 
Pils, Eva ‘“Disappearing” China’s Human Rights Lawyers,’ in Mike McConville and Eva Pils (editors), 
Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, Elgar Publishing (2013) (‘Disappearing’); Pils, Eva, 
‘‘Asking the Tiger For His Skin: Rights Activism in China,’ Vol XXX (2007) Fordham International Law Journal, 
pp. 1209 -1287 (‘Asking the Tiger’). 
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measures that their goal is isolating them from other lawyers and preventing them from forming 
groups and building alliances, following the strategy ‘split and disintegrate, discipline and strike, 
educate and rescue’ (fenhua wajie, chengjie daji, jiaoyu wanjiu 分化瓦解, 承接打击, 教育挽
救).56 Repression, on the other hand, gives lawyers incentives to tackle the political causes of 
their predicament.57 
Organisation by human rights lawyers and other human rights defenders must be 
understood against this background. It has adopted, broadly speaking, two types of strategy: the 
formation of advocacy groups bearing a name and visible organisational structure, exemplified in 
the present discussion by Gongmeng, one of the earliest groups; and the creation of more fluid, 
less visible structures of interaction and coordination amongst rights lawyers, without setting up 
formal or informal nongovernmental organisations. The experience of Xu Zhiyong and the 
organisations and initiatives he started spans across this spectrum.  
In 2003, the year of the Sun Zhigang Incident, Xu and some fellow legal academics 
including Teng Biao came together to form a gongmin lianmeng 公民联盟 or ‘Civic Alliance,’ 
that became known as Gongmeng  (in English, Open Constitution Initiative).58  As a rights 
advocacy group, Gongmeng successfully engaged in advocacy on a variety of human rights 
issues that also represented mass grievances. For example, true to their origins in a case 
concerning liberty of the person, they led a campaign against the use of so-called Black Jails, 
unofficial places of detention used for holding unwelcome petitioners, come to the capital to 
lodge complaints against the authorities. Gongmeng worked with petitioners to go to such 
unofficial holding places and demand that inmates be liberated. They did so generally without 
immediate success, because the jailors were concerned about the consequences of exposure for 
themselves; 59 but eventually, the central authorities were persuaded to make clear that at least in 
principle, unofficial prisons were unacceptable, and to shut down some of them.60 Gongmeng 
also worked on other mass grievances, such as forced evictions, the household registration 
system, and equal education rights for the children of migrant workers. They also took on cases 
and issues that arose ad hoc, such as the tainted milk-powder scandal in 2009, a case of 
adulterated milk-powder that came to affect some three hundred thousand babies fed tainted 
milk, causing an unconfirmed number of death;61 and they did not shy away from working on 
issues the authorities were bound to regard as highly ‘sensitive,’ such as the human rights of 
Tibetans in the wake of unrest that broke out in Tibet in 2009.62  
                                                          
56 #23 2013-1. Summing up their experience of repression, a lawyer commented in July 2014, ‘Pressure from the 
authorities … is invisible but palpable. It comes from the departments in charge, such as the justice bureaux and 
lawyers’ association and judicial organs,  and from the secret police such as the guobao (public security domestic 
security protection squad) and guo’an (state security), and then there is a sort of additional, comprehensive pressure 
coming from all sides. ‘#73 2014-3. 
57 Eva Pils, ‘“Disappearing” China’s Human Rights Lawyers,’ in Mike McConville and Eva Pils (editors), 
Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, Elgar Publishing (2013); ‘‘Asking the Tiger For His Skin: 
Rights Activism in China,’ Vol XXX (2007) Fordham International Law Journal, pp. 1209 -1287;’ Chapter 6 of 
China’s human rights lawyers, supra.  
58  #2 2013-3. 
59 Xu Zhiyong is interviewed about this work by Melissa Chan, 'China’s Black Prisons Uncovered,' 3 June 2009, at 
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/04/chinas-black-jails-uncovered/ 
60 ‘Inside China’s “Black Jails, ” Al Jazeera 13 March 2012 at http://blogs.aljazeera.com/asia/2012/03/13/seeking-
answers-inside-chinas-black-jails 
61 Li Fangping, ‘The Zhao Lianhai Case of “Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble,”’ Human Rights Bi-weekly, 30 
March 2010, http://www.hrichina.org/en/content/4845.   
62 藏区 3.14事件社会、经济成因调查报告的副本 http://chinaseries.blogspot.co.uk/2009/06/314.html。  
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As official structures like ACLA were clearly hostile to their advocacy and, indeed, 
colluded in their persecution, and conventional, NGO-like civil society platforms like NGOs 
were liable to be persecuted, lawyers had to find other ways of creating effective advocacy 
groups.  According to several lawyers, the formation of independent associative structures 
(lüshituan 律师团) is a direct reaction to the official associations’ general failure to protect and 
occasional collusive attempts to persecute them. For example, one lawyer stated:  
 
‘(…) Legal teams are formed because the Lawyers Associations are inactive – they do not 
function as organisations for lawyers.’63 
 
A colleague of his elaborated, arguing that ‘the judicial authorities’ – including judicial bureaux – 
had failed them.  
 
‘My view is that lawyers’ teams emerged because the judicial authorities didn’t act in 
accordance with the law and do not respect the law. If lawyers could engage in regular 
legal practice, then the judicial authorities would not have triggered resistance from the 
lawyers. The lawyers resist, because very commonly there is no justice in the judicial 
process. Lawyers feel that if each one of them just relies on themselves, they are too 
weak. So they get together and unite – spontaneously, without there being an 
organisation.’ 64    
 
A widely noticed example of the legal teams mentioned here was that established in 2011 in the 
case of the ‘Beihai lawyers,’ in which dozens of lawyers travelled to Beihai City to provide 
criminal defence and moral support to four of their colleagues, detained on patently spurious 
charges of falsifying evidence, after defending four (later five) young men whose confessions to 
a murder they had not committed had been extracted through torture. The lawyers who went to 
rescue their colleagues in turn suffered attacks at the hand of thugs, including the very severe 
beating of Lawyer Li Jinxing 李金星; but they were able to use social media to report their own 
plight, that of their colleagues, and their colleagues’ clients, successfully causing widespread 
outrage in professional circles, and ultimately achieving convictions for a lesser crime for the 
original defendants and the release of their professional colleagues. The case was widely seen as 
a (relative) success signalling the emergence of the legal team as a significant socio-political 
phenomenon.65  
Especially from 2010 onward, human rights lawyers have also formed or discussed the 
possible formation of a number of other groups whose focus is not an individual case but, rather, 
a particular cause or issue, such as the death penalty,66 torture, forensic evidence; disability 
rights, and forced abortions. These groups pool expertise and insights to work on individual 
cases of injustice while at the same time seeking to engage in wider advocacy by reporting on 
                                                          
63 #30 2013-1; similarly  #70 2013-1;  #67 2013-1 (no audio-recording), #14 2013-1.   
64 #71 2013-1 
65  Chen Yanhui (谌彦辉), ‘内地现律师组团打官司 / Neidi xian lüshi zu tuan da guansi [The phenomenon of 
lawyers’ litigation teams emerges in Mainland],’ 9 January 2012 at  
http://news.ifeng.com/shendu/fhzk/detail_2012_01/09/11851698_0.shtml; also #85 2013-1.  
66 The less explicit name of the group in Chinese is 北京兴善研究所 / Beijing Xingshan Yanjiusuo. China Against 
Death Penalty (CADP) /北京兴善研究所 / Beijing Xingshan Yanjiusuo, website at www.cadpnet.org/en/ (link dead 
as of November 2016).   
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cases they handle and holding training and research meetings. There is also a Human Rights 
Lawyer Group that has announced its existence through weibo (微博) micro-blogs and other 
social media such as WeChat  (weixin, 微信), and Telegram (dianbao, 电报), 67  and that  
(partially) migrated, or populated in new formations, groups set up on Whatsapp and Signal as 
the other social media became less safe from Party-State scrutiny and interference.68 Even at a 
time when the number of human rights lawyers had risen to an estimate 300 or more,69  lawyers 
explained that three hundred was not enough – that in order to become a significant force in civil 
society, a thousand, or event five or ten thousand lawyers would be needed,70 not least because 
rights lawyers themselves were in constant need of legal counsel. A Lawyers Rights Defence 
Network, set up to meet this demand, was described as having  
 
‘our own website, our own decision mode, and our own way of seeking donation…. we 
want to establish a grassroots NGO that complements the official Lawyers’ Association, 
to help lawyers in distress, for example, when they disbarred.  71 
 
The lawyer went further to explain their relationship with the official lawyers’ associations.  
 
Of course we are in fact a lawyers’ association but we don’t say so – we are entirely set 
up like a bar association, but we are more democratic than the [official] lawyers’ 
association, for example through our voting mechanism.  72 
 
Rights lawyer and scholar Teng Biao 滕彪 has observed that these efforts are reminiscent of 
what the scholar Clay Shirky has sought to analyse as a global phenomenon of social organising 
‘without organisation’ in the time of the internet and social media.73 Shirky argues that certain 
uses of the internet allow for mass amateurisation of certain kinds of action, such as journalistic 
reporting, and that they challenge traditional ideas of how political power is organized in 
(sovereign) states with governments and related structures.  While he does not think that the 
tectonic shift brought about by new communication forms will make government wither away, 
he argues that this shift does affect what he describes as an institutional monopoly on large scale 
                                                          
67 Voice of America, ‘维权律师发起成立中国保障人权律师服务团/ Weiquan lüshi faqi chengli Zhongguo 
baozhang renquan lüshi fuwutuan[Chinese weiquan lawyers initiate and establish a Human Rights Protection 
Lawyers’ Service Team], VoA (Chinese), 15 September 2013 at http://www.voachinese.com/content/china-right-
20130915/1750006.html. Note that For a news report on this group (中国人权保障律师服务团), see维权律师发起
成立中国保障人权律师服务团[Chinese weiquan lawyers initiate and establish a Human Rights Protection 
Lawyers’ Service Team], VoA (Chinese), 15 September 2013 at http://www.voachinese.com/content/china-right-
20130915/1750006.html. 
68 Groups with similar names kept being formed, dissolving, and regrouping from 2013 until the end of the period 
during which research for this project was conducted. They key people remained largely the same. The author 
followed these migrations over the years and is primarily part of groups on Telegram, Whatsapp and Signal as the 
time of this writing.  
69 #73 2014-1.  
70 #14 2014-1, #22 2014-1, #73 2014-1.  
71 #73 2014-1.  
72 #73 2014-1.  
73 Teng Biao 2012a, ‘Rights Defence, Microblogs, and the Surrounding Gaze: The Rights Defence Movement 
Online and Offline,’ in Locating Civil Society: Communities Defending Basic Liberties, Issue of China Perspectives 
2012 / no.3; Shirky, Clay, Here Comes Everybody:  The Power of Organising Without Organisations, Penguin, 
London, 2008.   
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coordination currently held by governments. This institutional monopoly, in Shirky’s view, is 
challenged by today’s new media and the fluid, easily changing, unfixed forms of social 
coordination and flash-mob style action challenging power they allow for.  
Such forms of organizing are of clear relevance to civil society activism in today’s China, 
and they might stand a chance of succeeding even in the restrictive conditions of the Chinese 
system. New modes of activism present unprecedented challenges to the government, which is 
certainly correctly characterized as hitherto holding a monopoly on large scale organization. Yet, 
the examples of both the human rights lawyer groups mentioned above, and the more ambitious 
and potentially momentous rights-lawyer-initiated New Citizen Movement discussed below also 
illustrate certain inherent limits of politically organizing without organization, at least in China.  
 
 
IV The rise and suppression of the New Citizen Movement      
 
The NGO Gongmeng had achieved some remarkable successes; but in 2009, Gongmeng and Xu 
Zhiyong came under attack for alleged tax evasion.74 The company that had been registered to 
give Gongmeng a legal existence, continued to exist. But as it had been ostracised and forced to 
stop taking foreign funding, the group continued to operate only with difficulty.75 Following the 
attempt to crush it, and given an overall tightening of advocacy spaces observed by rights 
lawyers, Gongmeng seemed to be a no longer entirely adequate platform for pursing the civil 
right goals of the ‘civic alliance’ it was originally meant to be. Its co-creator Xu had also reached 
the view that there should be a chance in strategy and approach. Speaking at a conference in 
2013, Xu explained:  
  
‘In the nearly ten years from the Sun Zhigang Incident, our main work really was rights 
defence in individual cases… [but] from last year [2012] onward, our modus operandi 
changed. We have gone from [working on] individual cases to wider advocacy, calling for 
everyone to be a citizen.’76 
 
The New Citizen Movement, initiated in May 2012 by Xu and others, reflected this changed, 
more explicitly political mode of advocacy. More assertively than the earlier Gongmeng 
organisation, the New Citizen Movement makes use of a normatively rich and ambitious concept 
of citizenship. It is a conception that reaches far back into China’s indigenous liberal or 
republican tradition, with the idea of gongmin 公民, ‘public person,’ initially associated with 
intellectuals of the late imperial area such as Kang Youwei, and political figures such as Sun Yat-
                                                          
74 Osnos, Evan, ‘Where is Xu Zhiyong?,’ at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/2009/07/where-
is-xu-zhiyong-evan-osnos-in-the-new-yorker.html.   
75   #2 2009-1; Teng Biao  (滕彪); 公盟不死 / Gongmeng bu si [Gongmeng is not dead]. 17 January 2009 at 
http://blog.qq.com/qzone/622007804/1248271496.htm ; 公民在行动 / Gongmeng zai xingdong [Citizens are being 
active], Citizen Monthly (公民月刊 / Gongmin yuekan), January 2009; Simon, Karla, ‘The Regulation of Civil 
Society Organisations in China,’ (2011) at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1781075.  
76 Xu Zhiyong, intervention at ‘The Constitution, the Media and the Chinese Rights Defence Movement: Ten Years 
after the Death of Sun Zhigang,’ Hong Kong, 13 April 2013, 
http://www.law.cuhk.edu.hk/en/research/crj/news/20130413-sunzhigang-coverage.php (Xu was under informal 
house arrest I mainland China and spoke via Skype).  
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sen, 77 as well as to the European enlightenment era.78 It evokes older historical references to the 
broader concept of gong 公.79 As scholar and rights advocate Xu Zhiyong 许志永 explained at a 
‘civic meal’ in late 2012,   the concept 
 
‘[…] reflects what sort of system the State should have, what the relationship between the 
State and its citizens should be, and [the idea of] civil society as an independent and free 
entity.’ 80 
 
Choosing ‘freedom, justice, love’ (ziyou自由, gongyi公义, ai 爱) as its motto, the Movement, 
according to Xu, saw these values as expressive of ‘the new democratic spirit of the Chinese 
nation’ and of ‘the universal values of mankind.’81   
 In 2010, Xu and some others published an online ‘Citizens’ Pledge,’ calling for citizens to 
sign up by sending an email. The general pledge stated: 
 
1. ‘My conduct will be rooted in conscientiousness, understanding, respect, and love and 
care for my fellow human beings; 
2. I will respect the Constitution and the laws and defend their correct implementation; 
3. In my life, I will, with legal means and with a caring heart, defend social justice and 
practice/manifest social righteousness.’82 
  
The online call also specified how citizens in different roles and positions, including lawyers, 
should act:  
 
4. ‘In my station at work I will follow the following minimum moral standards: 
…. As a lawyer, I will be true to the law and not bribe judges.’ 83 
 
The email action provided the initiators with a database of names, which they could then contact 
to initiate further activities. On this basis, in the course of meetings apparently beginning in May 
2012,84 Xu and others founded the New Citizen Movement.  
                                                          
77 The founding father of the Republic of China also claimed as founding father of the Party’s erstwhile arch enemy, 
the Kuomintang.  For this origin of the calligraphy see Bei Li, calligraphy, 12 June 2012 at 
https://plus.google.com/107919448256984307579/posts/UqUxVFoDziD.  
78 Shama, Simon, Citizens. A Chronicle of the French Revolution, London 1989. 
79 As in tian xia (wei) gong 天下为公.  
80 Xu, Zhiyong, ‘谁把“自由,公义, 爱”当成敌人, 一定是中华民族的敌人/ Shuei ba “ziyou, gongyi, ai” dangcheng 
diren, yiding shi Zhonghua minzu de diren! [Who turns “freedom, justice, love” into an enemy is clearly an enemy 
of the Chinese nation!],’ Citizen Special Issue (公民专刊  Gongmin zhuankan) no. 8 （2013）, p. 76 ff. at p. 78.   
81 Xu Zhiyong, intervention at ‘The Constitution, the Media and the Chinese Rights Defence Movement: Ten Years 
after the Death of Sun Zhigang,’ Hong Kong, 13 April 2013, 
http://www.law.cuhk.edu.hk/en/research/crj/news/20130413-sunzhigang-coverage.php.  
82 Boxun (Peacehall) Website, ‘著名维权人士许志永发布《公民维权手册》[Prominent human rights defender Xu 
Zhiyong publishes “Citizen Rights Defence Handbook”],’ 18 April 2010, 
http://boxun.com/news/gb/china/2010/04/201004182312.shtml; copy of handbook available at  
http://www.scribd.com/doc/17479805/%E5%85%AC%E6%B0%91%E7%BB%B4%E6%9D%83%E6%89%8B%E
5%86%8C; Custer (trans), ‘The Citizen’s Pledge,’ 20 June 2012 at http://chinageeks.org/2010/06/xu-zhiyong-et-al-
the-chinese-citizens-pledge/. 
83 Ibid. It is of note that the ‘New Citizen Movement’ uses as its logo a distinctive calligraphy usually displayed 
white or silver on blue, based in a piece of calligraphy by Sun Yat-sen.. 
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What makes the concept of citizen a good point of reference around which to organise a 
movement is that it is so clearly recognised by official-legal jargon, as much as it also is a 
concept used in the context of rights defence and dissent. 85  So, for example, the PRC 
Constitution uses the term, even as authorities reject wider liberal and democratic political values 
and had remained distrustful of the idea of ‘citizens’ society’ or ‘civil society’ as an element of 
political legitimacy.86 The concepts of love and – to a lesser degree – justice and freedom, on the 
other hand, seem to speak directly to the communities of those who experience injustice or 
oppression or emotional or other forms of deprivation. Their use reflects the expectations of a 
pop culture dependent on ‘emotional’ social media communication and emotive politics in ways 
that have been discussed with some concern in the context of other popular movements. Yet as 
seen from the quoted passages above, and in contrast to populist parties and movements 
elsewhere, 87   the New Citizen Movement explicitly aims to overcome ‘us against them’ 
narratives and to foster inclusiveness, rather than ressentiment or fear. This aspect of its stated 
agenda calls to mind the work of contemporary political philosophers seeking to craft novel 
interpretations of certain ‘political emotions.’ According to the argument Nussbaum has 
advanced, for example, love as a distinct form of public emotion (‘political love’) ought to be 
cultivated in a liberal society, and it ‘matters to justice.’ 88  
But what could this movement achieve in China’s highly illiberal, restrictive and 
repressive conditions? Despite their ambitious political advocacy goals, the initiators realised 
that their options were limited. For example, there was no chance of founding a political party. 
All independent, oppositional parties ever formed in the history of the PRC have been either 
crushed or reduced to total insignificance; and many of their founders have gone to prison for 
many years. Drawing on past examples of failed attempts openly to found a political party, a 
lawyer commented,  
 
‘Just think, whether we talk about the Chinese Democratic Party of 1998, 89  or the 
Chinese Social Democratic Party of 1992,90 everybody has by now thought it through; or 
perhaps as a result of recent developments, we are now even clearer than before: the risks 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
84 The initial meeting was organised in a discreet manner but nevertheless interrupted by the police.  
85 Goldman, Merle, From Comrade to Citizen: The Struggle for Political Rights in China, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge Mass.: 2004 at p. 10 f. 
86  In addition to the later Document No 9 (discussed later), see e.g. Zhou Benshun, ‘走中国特色社会管理创新之
路/Zou Zhongguo tese shehui guanli chuangxin zhi lu / The Path to Innovation of Social Management with Chinese 
Characteristics,’ 16 May 2011 at http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2011/2011010/201105/t20110513_80501.htm ; 
translation based on that by Flora Sapio at her Forgotten Archipelagoes blog, entry of 6 July 2011 at 
http://florasapio.blogspot.hk/2011/06/belated-translation-zhou-benshun-road.html. 
87 Toril Aalberg and Claas de Vreese, ‘Comprehending Populist Political Communication,’ in Populist Political 
Communication in Europe (Routledge, Abingdon, 2016) at pp. 4 f.;  Sara Ahmed, The cultural politics of emotion 
(Routledge, Abingdon, 2006), especially Chapter 3 (‘The affective politics of fear’) at pp. 62-81. 
88 Martha Nussbaum, Political Emotions (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2013), especially chapter 11 
(‘How love matters to justice), at pp. 388 f.  
89 See the Chinese Democratic Party [中国民主党] at http://www.hqcdp.org/ (Chinese) and 
http://www.hqcdp.org/english/ (English), accessed 28 December 2013.  
90 See the Chinese Social Democratic Party [中国社会民主党] at http://www.csdparty.org/index.html, accessed 28 
December 2013.   
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associated with this kind of organisation are extremely high. Consider that Hu Shigen,91 
for example, was sentenced to 20 years. And Qin Yongmin [to eleven years].92  Their 
prison sentences were just too long.’93  
 
It was equally impossible to create an NGO, registered or not, that would serve the function of 
propagating a political ideal of ‘citizenship’ -- after all, this had been tried with the NGO 
Gongmeng, short for ‘civic alliance,’ which (as detailed earlier on) had come under increasing 
pressure from the authorities.  
The Movement, instead, took recourse to the forms of action discussed as social 
organising ‘without organisation’ by Clay Shirky, 94  echoing the methods adopted by the 
movements of the ‘Arab Spring’ and by ‘Occupy’ movements around the world. The New 
Citizen Movement’s goal was to bring people together as citizens. Accordingly, all of the 
Movement’s actions made use of the social media and other internet tools, and they included a 
range of easy-to-join activities, the simplest of which was to gather for a meal.95  
 
‘Everybody comes together under a shared identity to join in a meal and to discuss some 
common issues together…Citizens in all locations shall develop spontaneously; they 
control their own stories, and people in each location do their own thing and have their 
own local topics, so that Guangzhou and Chengdu have their different local topics.”’96 
 
As co-initiator Xiao Shu explained, one point of this action was to ‘lower the threshold’ for 
citizens’ participation – what could possibly be wrong about, and how could the authorities be 
alarmed by, people having a meal together?  
 Gathering for a meal allowed the movement to realise the goals of inclusiveness, as well 
as to convey a peaceful message, consciously opposed to any idea of underground or violent 
opposition.97 At the same time, even the decision to attend a ‘civic dinner’ could be interpreted as 
a conscious political choice, just as the appeal to the concept of citizenship could be understood 
both as a simple descriptive fact and as a political message, namely that everybody could choose 
                                                          
91 Human Rights in China, ‘Prisoner Profile: Hu Shigen,’ at 
http://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/CRF.4.2004/PrisonerProfile4.2004.pdf, accessed 28 December 
2013.   
92 ‘Human Rights in China, ‘Democracy Activist Qin Yongmin Released from Prison after 12-Year Sentence,’ 
HRIC, 29 November 2010 at http://www.hrichina.org/en/content/4879, accessed 28 December 2013.   
93 #2 2013-7.  
94 Teng Biao 2012a, ‘Rights Defence, Microblogs, and the Surrounding Gaze: The Rights Defence Movement 
Online and Offline,’ in Locating Civil Society: Communities Defending Basic Liberties, Issue of China Perspectives 
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95 ‘Citizen meals’ were to take place at the same time (on the last Saturday of every month) in different cities across 
China. 
96 Xu, ibid. 
97  Xu Zhiyong 2013b, ‘公民许志永: 关于月末公民同城聚餐和“小圈子”区别的说明 [Citizen Xu Zhiyong: 
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Then Years after the Death of Sun Zhigang,’ at the Centre for Rights and Justice, Faculty of Law, The Chinese 
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to be a citizen in the normative, political liberal or republican sense, and that collectively, 
citizens had political power.  
For the purpose of this project, the author was able to observe some three or four ‘citizen 
meals’ held in different locations, with different participants, in 2012 and 2013.  While some 
meetings were arranged in somewhat clandestine manner to avoid participants’ being prevented 
from attending, the meals as such seemed open and were not organised using a pre-determined 
agenda.98 The openness this reflected was characteristic and, in the perspective of the New 
Citizen Movement’s commitments, crucial – as participants explained, no citizen should be 
excluded. The pragmatic answer to the pervasive possibility of monitoring by the authorities was 
demonstratively not to mind; or at least to refuse to nurture suspicion, because this was the best 
way of subverting the intended effects of monitoring.  
Participants at the ‘citizen meals’ observed included lawyers, petitioners, teachers, and 
writers; specific human rights issues; and perceived deficiencies of the existing political system. 
The conversation ranged across diverse topics. It included political questions such as how a 
greater number of people could be motivated to identify and act as citizens with rights, in the 
spirit of the Movement, and how best to achieve the stated aims of promoting participants’  self-
awareness as citizens with rights and responsibilities, foster a sense of civic community, craft 
messages of rights advocacy, and protest social grievances that could engage a wide community 
of people.99. But conversation was by no means limited to such political topics.100  
Soon, however, collective actions became more explicitly political; and therefore the 
‘threshold’ – or the risks – of participation rose. In the course of 2013, flash-mob-like 
demonstrations by small groups of people unfurling banners in public places and later making 
pictures of their protest available online were used to call for asset disclosure by public officials. 
This might be read as a bid to connect to a simultaneously held official anti-corruption campaign; 
however, in the official campaign the authorities of course decided who should be 
investigated, 101  one of the reasons why some interpreted it as merely a purge of political 
opponents. By asking for general financial disclosure on the part of (major) public officials, the 
New Citizen Movement made the point that to be effective, anti-corruption measures must 
eliminate the arbitrary selection of targets.  
Another campaign was for ‘equal education rights’ (jiaoyu pingdeng quan教育平等权) 
and aimed primarily to protest the widespread practice of denying the children of migrant 
workers in the cities access to state-funded schools. Like the detention system that provided the 
setting for Sun Zhigang’s death, the bifurcation of rural and urban citizens is based on the hukou 
or ‘household registration’ system, a roots cause of what some have described as a duality of 
higher-and loser class citizens in China. This system was created in the late 1950s, 102  when 
China practiced a planned economy. With the Reform and Opening era, it lost its original 
                                                          
98 At one meeting, someone showed up who said they had come in response to an online announcement of the 
gathering; they seemed not to be acquainted with any other participants. This participant, too, was welcomed and 
included in discussion. 
99 Author observation in at Citizen Meal meeting in 2012.  
100 Author observation on three different occasions in two different locations in 2012 and 2013.  
101 For a discussion of recent trends in the context of Party investigations, see An Pei (安培), 网事焦点一案双查 / 
wangshi jiaodian yi an shuang cha[Online Focus: Dual Investigations in One Case],’ Radio Free Asia, 6 February 
2014 http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/meiti/aw-02062014151216.html.  On potential abuses, see also 
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102 Statutes on Household Registration Hukou dengji tiaoli 户口登记条例 passed on 9 January 1958 by the NPC. 
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function of restricting freedom of movement; but due to this system, internal migrants are treated 
in some ways like illegal immigrants or as second-class citizens in the urban centres.103 Since 
urban centres have created local rules of ‘immigration’ control,104 most migrants are unable to 
change their household registration to an urban one, and consequently they have no or less easy 
access to public services including healthcare and education for their children, who are generally 
given the household registration of their parents.105 As a result, they have to go to privately 
established schools for migrants, most of which are inferior to the state schools.106 Even these 
inferior schools have on occasion been targeted by orders to close or simply by being 
demolished.107  
Xu Zhiyong and Gongmeng had been leading efforts to provide legal aid to parents 
challenging the exclusion of their children from state schools for several years; they had 
established an informal network of parents supporting these efforts. With the initiation of the 
New Citizen Movement, their efforts became part of the movement. This included one occasion 
when some 100 family members of children denied access to state schools went to the ‘Letters 
and Visits’ office of the Ministry of Education in Beijing to submit a complaint about the 
relevant policies. While the authorities were later to claim that this activity had seriously 
disrupted ministry workers, the New Citizen Movement claimed that it had been conducted in a 
peaceful, non-disruptive manner.108   
Both the campaign for equal education rights for migrant worker children and the 
campaign for asset disclosure were political and pedestrian at the same time. They made specific 
demands that could be expected to garner sympathy among large numbers of people: access to 
education for children and effective ways of combating corruption are popular concerns, in 
Chinese society certainly no less than in any other society. Transparent use of public funds, 
public scrutiny of power-holders susceptible to the temptations of corruption, and basic equality 
of access to public services are also vital to any decent political system; so these concerns 
connect to wider concerns about the functionality of the political-legal system. Soon, pictures of 
activists unfurling nearly identical banners in a variety of urban locations all over China were 
circulated, most importantly via the same social media, which were also used to organise such 
activities. 109  
                                                          
103 Xuefei Ren, Urban China (Cambridge, Polity Books 2013), 51 ff. On legal and political advocacy against this 
system, see China Law Professor Blog (Donald C. Clarke), ‘The Famous Hukou Editorial’ (26 March 2010), 
available at <http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/2010/03/the-famous-hukou-editorial.html> 
[last accessed 30 October 2016].  
104 A quota system was established by individual urban centers. Wang Fei-Ling describes a trend to abolish quotas in 
the period from 1997 to 2002 in Wang Fei-Ling, ‘Reformed Migration control and New Targeted people: China’s 
Hukou System in the 2000s’ (2004) The China Quarterly 115, 119.  
105 Charlotte Goodburn, ‘Educating Migrant Children: The effects of rural-urban migration on access to primary 
Education’ in S. Guo, & Y. Guo (eds), Spotlight on China: Changes in Education under China's Market 
Economy (Rotterdam, Sense Publishers 2015), available at 
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/12725675/Charlotte_Goodburn_chapter_Educating_Migrant_Children_revised.
pdf.   
106 Ibid at p. 6. 
107 Zhao Han, ‘Rule Change Forces Migrants' Children out of Beijing for School’ (Caixin Magazine, 16 February 
2015), available at <http://english.caixin.com/2015-02-16/100784599.html> [last accessed 30 October 2016].  
108张庆方律师：许志永案真相（修订版）, 17 July 2015, http://xgmyd.com/archives/1378.  




In the South of China, similar initiatives emerged. Like Xu Zhiyong as co-initiator of the 
New Citizen Movement, so did Guo Feixiong also see the street movements emerging in the 
South as a next stage in advocacy and activism that had begun with work on individual cases.  
 
 ‘We…organized a signature campaign to demand that the National People’s Congress 
ratify the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  We coordinated small-
scale street protests in eight cities in support of ICCPR and the government’s anti-
corruption policy.  Both actions were part of our strategy to promote the drafting of sound 
laws and the abolition of harmful ones.  This activity was a significant step forward in 
pressing against government red lines and in addressing universal values in civic action—
not just protesting individual grievances.’110 (Emphasis added) 
 
Some argued that the Southern Street Movement differed in certain respects from the New 
Citizen Movement. They thought that it was possibly even further-reaching or (in the eyes of the 
government) more directly politically provocative.  
 
‘The New Citizen Movement mostly raises issues like equal education rights and 
financial disclosure: this does not touch so much on the system and is still more moderate. 
Whereas actions here in the streets in the South address more directly the central 
problems of the system, for example, by requesting that the State ratify the ICCPR.111 
And, many of the slogans here are about democracy and constitutionalism and so on. 
They are more direct.’112  
 
Some also felt that political debates amongst human rights defenders in the South were more 
likely to address the question if nonviolent resistance could be successful in China’s repressive 
political environment. The New Citizen Movement took a clear stance against violence, whereas 
some within the Southern Street Movement were in theoretical support of violent resistance, 
even though, for strategic reasons, no one supported violent action at this particular time. 113 
As these – at the time - novel debates and initiatives unfolded during 2013, a rights 
lawyer close to these developments commented that 
 
 ‘There was a sense -  I felt there was some loss of control; because the people who 
participated all had their own preferences, and they were getting so enthusiastic...’114 
  
Predictably, these activities were interpreted as unacceptable challenges to the Party-State order 
and soon triggered measures to stop and punish the initiators. Lawyers, writers, activists and 
entrepreneurs were detained on various charges including ‘creating a social disturbance,’ illegal 
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assembly and ‘gathering a crowd to disrupt order in a public place.’115 Some of them were 
released after a while; others including Ding Jiaxi丁家喜, Xu Zhiyong and Zhao Changqing 赵
常青 were convicted and sentenced to prison. It appears that the authorities targeted all those 
who had participated in an initial meeting in early May 2012, including lawyers, scholars and 
other advocates. The authorities also detained and charged those who had engaged in advocacy 
in the South, including Guo Feixiong 郭飞雄 (Yang Maodong 杨茂东), a scholar and rights 
defender of many years’ experience who had previously gone to prison, inter alia, for supporting 
Lawyer Gao Zhisheng, and other figures in the Southern Street Movement.  
 Such actions had been anticipated at least by some of the initiators; and it was possible 
for the movement to react, for instance by the release of a short video-clip showing the detained 
Xu Zhiyong defiantly reiterating his support for the New Citizen Movement.116 The criminal 
trials of Xu Zhiyong and other New Citizen Movement participants held in January and February 
2014, reinforced this message:  Xu’s and other New Citizen Movement defendants’ lawyers 
largely remained silent  or got their clients to ‘dismiss’ them, the lawyers, at the beginning of the 
trial, in protest against its unfairness.117  They were more effective this way, even though they 
knowingly incurred risks, than if they had participated in a trial process which, to use the 
language of the lawyer’s comment quoted earlier, they regarded as mere ‘theatre.’ In a final 
statement to be read out at trial, Xu Zhiyong himself reiterated the principles of the movement he 
had co-initiated, and added an emotional plea.  
 
‘When hopes of reform are dashed, people will rise up and seek revolution. The 
privileged and powerful have long transferred their children and wealth overseas; they 
couldn’t care less of the misfortune and suffering of the disempowered, nor do they care 
about China’s future. But we do. Someone has to care. Peaceful transition to democracy 
and constitutionalism is the only path the Chinese nation has to a beautiful future. We lost 
this opportunity a hundred years ago, and we cannot afford to miss it again today.’118 
 
The fact that the court prevented him from reading his statement out in full underlined official 
anxieties about the civic challenge he spoke of, as well a bureaucratic desire to remain in control. 
Xu’s speech was circulated in print and included in a collection of his works that was translated 
into English.119  
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At his trial in Guangzhou in November 2014, the southern rights defender Guo Feixiong 
recalled the history of democracy protests since the mid-1980s. He said that the current 
movement had matured from the setback of 1989. His account of his own experience at the 
hands of the authorities, of interrogations and extremely brutal torture, as well as long hunger 
strikes, was also an account of survival, recovery and continuity,120 sublimated as a belief in 
continued struggle. 121     
 
‘Our dream, passed from generation to generation among activists, to see “the prisons 
overloaded with conscientious objectors,” is nearing realization.  Our faith is that 
totalitarianism, which negates so completely the humanity in its minions, will one day be 
driven from the earth.’122 
 
The emergence of the New Citizen Movement and its southern counterparts show how in 
China’s conflicted and hybrid system, a system that combines liberal and authoritarian elements, 
their principled opposition to authoritarian practices could drive a growing number of legal 
advocates into political opposition. The evolution of these movements also reflect the maturing 
of rights advocacy from work on individual cases and more specific causes to work on the 
broader, more abstract and ambitious goal of system transition to constitutional democracy and 
rule of law. The incarceration of some of the main protagonists of these initiatives was expected, 
accepted as a consequence of advocacy, and – as Xu’s and Guo’s concluding statements 
illustrated -- integrated into the initiative’s cause. When they went to prison, the structures of 
communication and coordinated action Xu, Guo and others had helped create remained active. 
Their concluding statements and many other messages of a similar nature could continue to be 
disseminated, and late as in April 2016 rights defenders referred to ‘same city citizen meals’ still 
being held in China.123 
 In the face of widespread criticism of these verdicts and the wider crackdown, the Party-
State media insisted that the criminal justice process had been lawful and the verdict just.  The 
following statement captures the positivistic tone of these messages. It insists that the law has 
been followed in Xu’s case and that no political or legal judgement has been passed.  
 
‘The 1st instance decision of the Beijing Intermediate Court was made in accordance with 
the current law and exhibited a firm and resolute attitude. This decision was neither about 
Xu Zhiyong’s morals [daode] or personal fibre [renpin]; nor was it to determine the 
nature of the slogans he shouted. It was merely an authoritative decision about where the 
legal boundaries lay, and about how far Xu Zhiyong had transgressed these boundaries.  
We believe that Chinese society truly needs such decisions, indeed, that it 
urgently needs them. While some people just are not very clear about what constitutes 
lawful, unlawful or indeed criminal conduct in areas that concern politics, a minority of 
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people love engaging in risky actions and taking their chances on whether the law will 
impose sanctions on their conduct.’124 
 
It should be noted that Xu Zhiyong revealed later that he was, in fact, tortured with cigarette 
butts and sleep deprivation during the initial months of his pre-trial detention – that in this and 
other respects, the law had not been followed in his case. 125 Guo Feixiong appears to have 
suffered even worse treatment – not only in pre-trial detention but also while serving his prison 
term.126 No country ‘urgently needs’ criminal processes such as those these two rights defenders 
had to go through.  
Yet, this sparse, carefully worded comment stands in clear contrast to the commentary 
the Party-State and its controlled media produced in later cases in the Xi Jinping era. Xu and Guo 
had been placed under pre-trial detention in the spring and summer of 2013, i.e. in the early 
months of Xi Jinping’s leadership, when it was only just beginning to reveal its contours. It was 
only later that the system began to control and repress human rights defenders and wider civil 
society in unprecedented ways. The China Xu was ‘released’ back into at the conclusion of his 
prison term in July 2017 was already a different place from the one he had been detained in, as 
discussed in the following section.127  
  
 
V. Lawyers in civic opposition since the clampdown on the New Citizen Movement       
 
Changes signalling a more explicit and unambiguous rejection of the values rights lawyers and 
their movements had sought to defend under Xi Jinping’s leadership began in 2013, the year of 
the clampdown on the New Citizen Movement and the Southern Street. In the month of Xu 
Zhiyong’s formal criminal detention, a document known as ‘Document No 9’ revealed the Party-
State’s intention to stop the discussion of ‘so-called “universal values”’ in places of learning.128 
In 2014, the Party at its 4th Plenary Meeting announced that Party leadership and socialist rule of 
law with Chinese characteristics were ‘identical.’129  In 2015, the Party-State made laws and 
issues Party rules that gave effect to the re-organisation of ‘social organisations’ on corporatist 
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principles and harsh control of foreign civil society organisations operating in China.130  It also 
created and revised national security related legislation reflecting clearly more authoritarian, if 
not neo-totalitarian, conceptions of law. For example, the 2015 National Security Law invoked 
‘People’s Democratic Dictatorship’131 as a guiding principle, 132 after decades of comparative 
reticence on the idea of ruling as a dictatorship against the enemies of the People.  
With regard to the legal profession, these changes of norms and attitudes have manifested 
in two major ways. On the one hand, there was an attempt to recruit the legal profession for the 
purposes of the Party-State in legal dispute resolution. 133 For example, a November 2015 Party 
Political-Legal Committee ‘Opinion’ by the announced that in future licenced professional 
lawyers would be expected to work as helpers of the authorities, required to ‘volunteer’ their 
services to help the party state address mass grievances. They were to ‘help petitioners get a 
correct understanding of the opinions of the authorities regarding the lawful handling of the case’ 
or, in case the authorities had made a mistake, ‘make suggestions to the governmental and legal 
authorities,’ or help petitioners apply for relief and assistance.’134  If successful, this measure of 
co-optation could gradually turn lawyers into functionaries of the Party-State. It could shift the 
lawyer’s responsibility: rather than being primarily responsible for the rights and interests of the 
clients, it seemed to create responsibility toward the government, and thus threatened to 
undermine their ability to engage in adversarial rights advocacy. 
On the other hand, new rules and (as of this writing) draft rules were introduced to 
tighten the already existing limitations of independent legal advocacy even further, and to recruit 
law firms more clearly as collaborators in enforcing such limitations. A September 2016 
Ministry of Justice Regulation on the Management of Law Firms, for example, imposed stringent 
requirements on Chinese law firms. They must ensure, inter alia, that their lawyers not  
 
‘publish distorting or misleading information on cases handled by themselves or others, 
or maliciously hype up cases…put pressure on the authorities and attack legal authorities 
or undermine the legal system by setting up groups, producing joint letters, or by 
publishing open letters;’… [and that they not] humiliate, defame, threaten or beat judicial 
personnel or participants in a litigation, or engage in denial of the state-determined nature 
of an evil sect organisation or other conduct seriously disrupting court order [or] publish 
or disseminate speech that denies the political order laid down in the Constitution, denies 
                                                          
130 Orville Schell, ‘Crackdown in China: Worse and Worse,’ New York Review of Books / China File,  6 April 2016, 
https://www.chinafile.com/nyrb-china-archive/crackdown-china-worse-and-worse.   
131人民民主专政 -- The CPC and state represent and act on behalf of the people, but may use dictatorial powers 
against reactionary forces. In Chinese, the word used for ‘dictatorship’ (专政) does not have clearly negative 
connotations, unlike dictator 独裁(者) or hegemon 霸王.  
132 Article 2 of 中华人民共和国国家安全法[National Security Law of the People's Republic of China], passed on 
July 1, 2015 at the 15th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People's Congress. 
133 One might argue that this continued a trend of weakening adjudicative dispute resolution mechanisms begun 
earlier. Carl F. Minzner, ‘China’s Turn Against Law,’ 59 American Journal of Comparative Law (2011) 935. 
134 Party Central Political Legal Committee Opinion on Establishing A System for Lawyers to Participate in 
Resolving and Acting as Legal Representatives in Litigation-Related Petitioning Cases (Trial Version) [中央政法委
《关于建立律师参与化解和代理涉法涉诉信访案件制度的意见(试行)》] , 10 November 2015, published at 
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compensation for the lawyers.   
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fundamental principles or endangers national security, or use the internet or the media to 
stoke discontent toward the Party and Government.’135   
 
As especially the last quoted phrase shows, law firms are essentially placed under obligation to 
ensure that their staff politically censor themselves. Noncompliance, according to Article 26 of 
the Regulation, puts the firms’ continued registration and hence their very existence at risk.  
These two trends of eliminating rights lawyers and remodelling other lawyers correspond 
to a reconceptualization of law along more authoritarian, if not neo-totalitarian or totalist, lines in 
the Xi era. According to Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political and his idea of the ‘total state,’ 
the very idea of the political requires the identification of enemies; and ‘the political’ has 
primacy in all legal orders regardless of their specific design and institutions.136 This approach 
supports an understanding of the institutions of the ‘law’ as first and foremost projecting the 
power of the state, not its limitation by law.137  
It is against this wider background that we must understand the crackdown on human 
rights lawyers and lay human rights defenders that followed the rise and repression of the New 
Citizen and Southern Street Movements. The so-called ‘709 Crackdown’ began with the 
detention of Lawyers Wang Yu and Bao Longjun and their sixteen year old son, Bao Zhuoxuan, 
in the night of 9 July 2015.138 Nearly simultaneously, the authorities also took away rights 
lawyers and assistants connected to Fengrui Law Firm, rights lawyer Li Heping and his 
colleagues and brother; and activist Hu Shigen and his supporters.  
Soon, it became clear that the 709 Crackdown was different from earlier ones, not only in 
terms of its scope but also in terms of its claimed justification, purpose, and specific methods. 
For one thing, the authorities had no hesitation in directly threatening prosecution for the mere 
act of taking up legal representation of, or engaging in advocacy for, a professional rights lawyer 
colleague, and demanding written guarantees of not engaging in any advocacy of this kind. One 
lawyer, who was ’caught’ when getting off a train and interrogated by domestic security police 
from his hometown, was warned that he would not be allowed to provide criminal defence to 
fellow lawyers detained in the course of the crackdown. Otherwise, the police told him, he would 
be regarded as a ‘co-suspect.’139 In addition to the main targets, who were detained, In addition, 
hundreds of lawyers and supporters were subjected to brief detentions or coerced ‘chats.’140 The 
authorities released most of the lawyers held or informally ‘invited to chats’ after a few hours or 
days.141 
                                                          
135律师事务所管理办法[Regulation on the Management of Law Firms], promulgated by edict 133 / 2016 of the 
Ministry of Justice on 6 September 2016, available at 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2016/content_5109321.htm.  
136 Carl Schmitt, 1922 (2005). Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty.  George Schwab 
(translation). Chicago: University of Chicago, p.5.  
137 On recent Carl Schmitt reception in China, see also Karl Marchal and  Carl K.Y. Shaw (editors), Çarl Schmitt 
and Leo Strauss in the Chinese-speaking World: Reorienting the Political, Lexington Books, 2017;  Flora Sapio, 
‘Carl Schmitt in China,’   The China Story blog, 7 October 2015, https://www.thechinastory.org/2015/10/carl-
schmitt-in-china/; Jean-Christopher Mittelstaedt, ‘Understanding China’s Two Constitutions: Re-assessing the role 
of the Chinese Communist Party.’ https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2682609,  
138 ‘709’ thus refers to the date when the crackdown began.  
139 Conversation #137-16-1. Similar: e.g. conversations #121-16-1; #138-16-1.  
140 China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (CHRLCG)  and Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) 
141 Among some twenty-five human rights lawyers sought out for (anonymous) conversations about 7-09 in 2016 
and 2017, only one had thus far entirely avoided the coerced ‘chat.’ Two had undergone detention and torture.  
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Second, from the first days of the crackdown, the authorities engaged in intense efforts to 
publicise what they were doing and to vilify the victims of their persecution. Within days from 
the first detentions, newspapers and national Chinese television carried elaborate, lengthy reports 
on the detainees, described, inter alia, as part of a ‘“rights defence” ring.’’142  In August 2016, 
some lawyers and their co-workers were subjected to ‘televised trials,’ during which they made 
even more elaborate statements of submission to the authority of the Party-State; others were 
forced to give ‘interviews’ to the media.  
For example, lawyer Zhou Shifeng was shown on television on the occasion of his 
subversion trial in August 2016. According to official reports of his and some of his colleagues’ 
trials, supplemented by purported trial ‘transcripts,’143 it was stated that the accused had ‘used a 
law firm as a platform to hype up key cases and incidents, and carrying out activities to subvert 
state power,’ and that together with others, he had ‘put forward systematic ideas, methods, and 
measures for the subversion of state power.’ 144 About to be convicted and sent to prison for 
seven years, Zhou Shifeng not only admitted guilt. He also spoke of his deep gratitude toward 
the Party-State – the very authorities that had publicly broadcast his statement of repentance 
shortly after his initial detention145 and held him incommunicado for over a year.  
 
‘Esteemed Presiding Judge, judges, state prosecutors and my two esteemed defence 
lawyers: you have all been put to so much trouble! Through today’s trial, I have come to 
realise fully what crimes I have committed, and the harm my actions have caused to the 
Party and the Government. I hereby express my deepest repentance toward our 
government! [Bows.] I trust that a trial so replete with fairness and justice and the rule of 
law as this will result in a fair verdict, and that it shall stand the test of history and legal 
scrutiny. I admit guilt and repent, admit guilt and subject myself to the law; and I will 
never appeal!146 … I thank the court! I thank the prosecutor! I thank my lawyers!’147  
 
It is difficult not to speculate that the implausible obsequiousness of these remarks might have 
been meant to send a message to his supporters. His mention of ‘the Party and State’ and his 
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145 Vivienne Zeng,  ‚Human rights lawyers targeted in unprecedented crackdown,’ Hong Kong Free Press, 13 July 
2015, <https://www.hongkongfp.com/2015/07/13/human-rights-lawyers-targeted-in-unprecedented-crackdown/>.   
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expression of gratitude toward his lawyers after the other participants in the trial certainly 
reflected the hierarchies underlying such a ‘politically sensitive’ trial.  
But we cannot tell if sarcasm was Zhou’s intention, because as in other ‘709’ crackdown 
cases, the authorities had taken far too good care to ensure that he would not be able to speak 
independently to anyone who might transmit a genuine message, from the moment he was first 
detained. For the first six months, he was placed under ‘residential surveillance in a designated 
location,’ a measure available in state security crimes cases, ensuring he was completely without 
access to legal counsel. The authorities also ensured that Zhou ‘represented’ by a lawyer the 
authorities had chosen (or in his case, suggested to the family) and that there was therefore no 
access to him right until trial. For the trial, they ensured that his family would not attend, by 
procuring a note, handwritten by Zhou, stating that he did not wish his family to attend – because 
‘they are all peasants with low educational attainment and…it would not be good for me or 
them.’148 While no independent accounts of the process Zhou’s trial are available, the author 
received a detailed account of how carefully another trial was negotiated, scripted and, indeed, 
rehearsed in one of the other 709 Crackdown cases;149 and available film footage of the trial 
seems consistent with the assessment that it was scripted.150 
Zhou’s was not the only case of such startling shows of self-humiliation. His former 
employee Wang Yu, to give one other example, also after being detained for over a year  
detained without access to independent counsel ‘on suspicion of state subversion,’ was put on 
display on the occasion of her purported ‘release on bail’ on 1 August 2016. Speaking in what 
appeared to be a holiday resort, she spoke to reporters filming her, renouncing her former 
advocacy, denouncing two foreign organisations151 for human rights awards given to her earlier 
that year, and, like Zhou, thanking and praising the authorities. The effects of these displays were 
further amplified by accompanying articles in the official news media, as well as further audio-
visual materials. For example, officially circulated video-clips cast human rights advocates as 
enemies, visually associating them with images of U.S. warfare and portraying Chinese human 
rights advocates as part of a U.S. based plot to subvert China.152 
 It was only some months later, in January 2017, that it became possible to confirm some 
of the facts explaining the 709 Crackdown victims’ strange and unsettling collaboration with the 
authorities in the criminal process. In late January 2017 Lawyer Li Chunfu, held since September 
2015, was released from over 500 days of incommunicado detention with signs of serious mental 
                                                          




B2%E5%8F%8B%E6%97%81%E5%90%AC%E5%BA%AD%E5%AE%A1.html.  In another case, the author 
learned that the 709 target had been explicitly requested to ‘de-invite’ their family. 
149 #300-17-1.  
150 See also Jun Mai, ‘How Chinese rights lawyer’s courtroom mea culpa went off script,’ South China Morning 
Post, 22 August 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2006700/how-chinese-rights-
lawyers-courtroom-mea-culpa-went:  ‘In a 10-minute final statement, the Peking University law school master’s 
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trial would “stand the test of the world”. The praise was not included in the official transcript published hours later.’ 
151 Namely, the American Bar Association and the Ludovic Trarieux Human Rights Prize Committee.  
152 颜色革命 Color Revolution, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8qBt-i9ErSY> [last accessed 7 
November 2016], English translation available at <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/08/hk-activist-branded-us-
backed-separatist-govt-video/> [last accessed 7 November 2016].   
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illness.153 A few days late, Lawyer Xie Yang, finally able to meet his defence lawyer, provided a 
detailed account of his torture to the lawyer, who decided to publish the news.154 In July 2017, 
Lawyer Wang Yu released a statement in which she described how she had been kept confined in 
a small box, deprived of food, and tormented in various other ways during her detention.155  By 
July 2017, it had emerged that some six detainees claimed to have been forcibly drugged. One of 
them commented in a conversation in July 2017 that  
  
 ‘It made you think you were finished this time. Mentally, it was [the scariest], because 
you couldn’t know [what you’d been given] and so you thought, for sure they want to kill 
you. You won’t get out of here alive.  
It was only in there that I understood what torture was. Whatever we’d been 
imagining before got nowhere near what it was like.’156 
 
These revelations suddenly seemed to explain a lot. It was no longer hard to understand why, 
unlike earlier persecuted rights defenders and dissidents, several of these latest victims had co-
operated so much with the authorities, once it was understood that forced drugging had been 
added to the usual torture methods and that by this means, the authorities had been able directly 
to affect their prisoners’ minds. 
The contrast between the 7-09 detainees’ experience, their public displays showing the 
former rights advocates entirely subdued, and the earlier trials of Xu Zhiyong, Guo Feixiong, et 
al, is significant in several respects. While Xu and Guo and their loved ones were subjected to 
unjust ordeals at the hands of the authorities, and despite the systematic efforts of the authorities 
to destroy the initiatives they had stated, they had at the point of their trials managed to preserve 
their dignity, sanity, and sense of purpose; and they had maintained channels of communication 
with a wider public through their criminal defence lawyers and their trials.  In their concluding 
statements, they were able to state their goals and their resolve to continue their advocacy once 
released, and to integrate their incarceration into a biography of legal-political activism which, at 
least according to their own public statements, made some sense to them.  
Moreover, in the cases of Xu and Guo and other defenders tried and punished in the 
context of the New Citizen Movement and Southern Street Movement, their public personae as 
advocates for a more liberal China had not been destroyed. One might even argue that their 
profiles had in some ways been enhanced by what was done to them, as well illustrated by  Xu 
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Zhiyong’s release of a video-clip from pre-trial detention, and Xu’s and Guo’s remarkable trial 
statements, discussed earlier on. They clearly envisaged coming out of prison in a state that 
would allow them to continue their work and self-defined mission.  The same was not true, by all 
available accounts and information, of any of the detainees affected by the ‘7-09’ crackdown. 
The attacks on the 7-09 detainees’ mental, as well as physical integrity was instead further 
amplified by the way its results were broadcast and advertised to the entire nation and even 
abroad. An interlocutor commented in April 2016 (after numerous reports had appeared, but 
before the August 2016 trials),  
 
‘[These reports] have in the eyes of many [rights lawyers] done the worst harm to us, 
because many ordinary people will be inclined to trust these official reports. They might 
have come across some positive information about rights lawyers; but after these 
detentions, they will be informed that these lawyers were working in their own interest, to 
earn foreign money, and that this entire circle has actually been doing these things under 
the direction of foreign anti-China enemy forces.’157  
 
Looking back to the ‘New Citizen Movement,’ ‘Southern Street Movement,’ and similar groups 
and initiatives from the vantage point of 2017, is in some ways easy go gauge how it will be 
possible for people in China to choose to ‘be a citizen’ (zuo gongmin, 做公民)158 in the Xi 
Jinping era.  This was a demanding and dangerous choice even in the years 2012-13; it has 
clearly become even more difficult since then.  
Yet, there is evidence that even in the face of the unprecedented ‘709 Crackdown,’ the 
extant community of human rights lawyers and lay human rights defenders has rallied and 
continued to operate, and that social networks, once created, are hard to destroy completely. In 
the context of ‘709,’ having been forced to ‘promise’ not to take on the cases of fellow rights 
lawyers; not to communicate about these cases via the social media; and not to take media 
interviews about them, they nevertheless went on to organize support for their detained 
colleagues. For example, the more well-known among the rights lawyers successfully recruited 
lawyers not yet known to the authorities to take on the criminal defence of their incarcerated 
colleagues;159 and after the accounts of Lawyer Xie Yang’s torture were disclosed, dozens of 
lawyers and other supporters came forward with pictures of themselves bearing messages of 
opposition to torture, and support for Xie Yang and other lawyers.160 Rights lawyers have also 
largely maintained their social media communication structures such as chat-groups; and 
activities directly targeted by the crackdown, such as workshops on sensitive issues, continue to 
be held; 161  and in some cases, spouses of the ‘709’ detainees transformed themselves into 
resourceful advocates not only of these, but increasingly also of other cases.162 In the context of 
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the New Citizen Movement, the website that was created as a platform for contributions from 
members and sympathizers has continued to post analysis and commentary until the time of this 
writing. Its title page continues to display Xu Zhiyong’s appeal.  
 
‘Citizens, let us begin right now. No matter where you are, what your profession is, and 
whether you are poor or rich, let us all from the bottom of our hearts, in our real lives, on 
the internet and on every inch of Chinese soil firmly and proudly proclaim the status that 





This article has analysed changes in rights lawyer advocacy over the past two decades.  
Focussing on the transmutations of lawyer-driven human rights advocacy from the Sun Zhigang 
case to the organisation Gongmeng and the New Citizen Movement, it has shown how advocacy 
has evolved from largely case-focused to more cause-focused and, ultimately, wider political 
human rights advocacy, and how this has triggered further political-legal consequences. The 
discussion here urges two major conclusions. First, the experience of human rights lawyers and 
human rights defenders more widely calls into question the incrementalist top-down reform 
paradigm long dominant in China law scholarship.  This is not only because the lawyers whose 
experience and voice have chiefly contributed to this article have found institutional spaces for 
legal advocacy shrinking; because they have reported few successes; and much of their work has 
ended in failure, on the terms of the institutions of the legal system. The severe repression of the 
NGO Gongmeng was discussed as one among several emblematic examples of the 
precariousness of rights advocacy throughout the past fifteen years. More clearly and 
momentously, incrementalist reform expectations have been crushed by the developments of the 
Xi Jinping era, in particular, the reconceptualization of law on explicitly anti-liberal terms, with 
severe implications for any further engagement in human rights advocacy. 
 Second, these – from the perspective of human rights advocates – disappointing 
institutional changes have shifted the focus of advocacy to bottom-up civic initiatives for 
political change that would have to happen, to allow for rule of law to be adequately safeguarded. 
It led to new civic lawyer associations’ increasingly explicit rejection of the existing, fixed, 
corporatist, and inert Party-State-provided organizational structures. The trajectory from 
Gongmeng, as a legal advocacy NGO, to the ‘New Citizen Movement’ has been used as a 
particularly important, albeit not the only example illustrating this trend toward more explicitly 
political demands as a result of years of suppression of weiquan demands and repression of 
rights defenders.  
The Party-State is not only absent from these new associative structures, which can be 
characterises as responses to institutional dysfunction within the Party-State, but clearly opposed 
to them, as those who build such structures are well aware. The exercise of rights of expression 
and association can strengthen a popular sense of these rights and associated civic values, even 
where such rights are severely curtailed and where their exercise is repressed. Citizens’ presence 
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and voice, civic rights advocacy outside of the institutions, channels and mechanisms has risen 
steadily since the beginning of the human rights movement, and in China (at least) as much as 
elsewhere, human rights is ‘a driver language behind values triggering political change,’164 in 
Ignatieff’s words, or at least a driver language demanding such change.  
The trajectory described here is thus also one from legal to political action, and from 
intra-institutional advocacy to resistance against the institutions of the system. It shows how 
important the exercise of expression rights in an environment hostile to the very idea of free 
political expression is, and it illustrates the deep connection between freedom of speech and the 
right of resistance, as the most central case of a right that cannot be understood on positivistic, 
authority-dependent terms. The model for citizen action which the New Citizen Movement 
represented might survive crackdowns better than more traditionally organized and visible 
movements. Together with other, similar and connected initiatives, these initiatives has helped 
crystallize a political momentum; it has created virtual-space networks that persist and can be 
revitalized for new advocacy purposes, even at times of democratic decline and authoritarian 
resurgence.    
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